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Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and National Automobile Dealers
Association v. Environmental Protection Agency, 642 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Dustin Leftridge
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) and the National Automobile
Dealers Association (NADA), on behalf of independent car dealerships, petitioned for review of
an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decision allowing California to implement stricter
greenhouse gas emission standards from automobiles. In Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America and National Automobile Dealers Association v. Environmental Protection
Agency,158 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the
petition for a lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals held that NADA failed to establish
standing to challenge the EPA‘s waiver of federal preemption under the Clean Air Act (CAA)
prior to the implementation of federal greenhouse gas emission standards. Additionally, the
court held the petition was moot for the years following the implementation of federal
greenhouse gas emission standards because California‘s regulations were identical to new federal
emission standards.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, California adopted regulations setting greenhouse gas emission standards for
new vehicles released in model year 2009.159 The CAA gives the federal government exclusive
authority to create regulations for emission standards.160 However, exclusion from the federal
preemption exists for states that adopted emission standards prior to 1966.161 California was the
only state to adopt emission standards prior to 1966 and therefore was the only state eligible to a
waiver of federal preemption.162 In 1977, Congress amended the CAA to enable other states to
adopt standards identical to California standards.163 In 2005, California asked the EPA to waive
federal preemptions and the EPA denied the request.164 In January 2009, California asked the
EPA to reconsider its previous denial.165 The EPA agreed to reconsider and in July 2009 issued
an order granting the waiver.166 Since the EPA‘s decision, fourteen states have adopted
California‘s greenhouse gas emission standards.167 In 2010, EPA and the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued new greenhouse gas emission standards
starting in 2012.168
In an agreement between the federal government, the state of California, and major
automobile manufactures, California modified its standards starting in 2012 to conform to the
EPA and NHTSA national standards.169 The current California specific standards remain in
place until 2012. In return for California‘s acquiescence to federal standards, major automobile
159
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manufactures and their trade associations made commitments to not oppose the 2012 national
standards or California preemptions under the CAA.170 However, the Chamber and NADA did
not join the agreement and, on behalf of their dealership members, filed a challenge to the EPA
waiver on September 9, 2009.171
VI. ANALYSIS
Prior to reaching the merits of the case, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the petitioner‘s claims.172 Federal courts are without authority to render advisory
options or to decide questions that do not affect the rights of the litigants of the case.173 The
court analyzed the doctrines of standing and mootness to justify their Constitutional limitations.
A. The Chamber and NADA did not meet the requirements to challenge the EPA waiver
on behalf of their membership for the years 2009 to 2012.
The Chamber and NADA claimed standing to sue on behalf of their members, in
particular, the automobile dealers. An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members
if: ―(1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his own right, (2) the interests
the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor
the relief requested requires that an individual member of the association participate in the
lawsuit.‖174 To satisfy the first element, an association is required to identify individual
members who suffered an injury.175 While NADA provided the declarations of two dealers
alleging injury and the court analyzed the validity of the individual dealers standing, the court
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concluded the Chamber did not meet the first element.176 The court found the last two elements
were met by both the Chamber and NADA.177
Standing requires that: (1) the plaintiff either has or will imminently suffer an actual,
concrete, and particularized injury; (2) the injury have a causal and traceable connection to the
complained of conduct; and (3) a favorable judicial decision would be likely to result in adequate
redress.178 The court noted the California regulations being challenged did not regulate
automobile dealers.179 The regulations affected automobile manufactures, thereby increasing the
burden of the dealers to demonstrate injury.180 The dealers claimed imminent injury from
possible price increases and possible limits on the type of cars delivered to dealerships in
California from 2009 to 2012.181 The court held the mere speculation of injury was insufficient
to establish standing.182 Further, the record did not contain any evidence demonstrating
substantial probability that injuries were imminent between 2009 and 2012.183
B. The promulgation of federal regulations for the years 2012 to 2016 nullifies NADA’s
claims of injury.
The NADA membership dealers successfully demonstrated that between 2012 and 2016
the California regulations would modify the type of cars produced and lead to price increases.184
The court acknowledged the dealers met their burden to demonstrate an injury during the
relevant time period. However, beginning in 2012, automobile manufactures will be required to
comply with the EPA and NHTSA standards.185 The California standards being challenged were
identical to the 2012 national standards. Thus, the EPA waiver for California will not be
176
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responsible for any injury NADA members suffer from higher prices or a change in inventory.186
The court held that even if NADA had standing when it initially sought review, the petition was
moot because the promulgation of the 2012 national emission standards made the court unable to
affect the rights of the parties.187
V. CONCLUSION
The court dismissed the action brought on behalf of the plaintiffs‘ members. The
Chamber and NADA failed to establish sufficient standing to challenge the EPA‘s waiver of
federal preemption for automobile emission standards. The petitioners failed to demonstrate
how the EPA‘s waiver had substantially injured individual members. The petitioners also fell
short of demonstrating how the EPA‘s waiver would cause injury to individual members above
and beyond the federal regulations that are to take effect in 2012. The court determined it lacked
jurisdiction to hear a case that did not affect the rights of the petitioners and dismissed the
petition. The court astutely observed that if this case had been brought on behalf of the
automobile manufacturers instead of the dealers, the case would not necessarily have been
dismissed for standing or mootness.188
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